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The International Competitive Aspects of U.S. and Canadian
Financial Incentives to Exports
James R. Sharpe*
Today, the news is full of reports concerning a broad range of intense,
complex international negotiations involving issues that can have a
profound political and economic impact on the world in which we live.
Arms negotiations, peace talks, cease-fire negotiations, trade disputes,
free trade agreements - there is no shortage of well-publicized subjects
to illustrate the point.
Over the past twenty-five years, however, the principal industrial-
ized exporting countries have quietly been engaged in a special type of
economic warfare on one hand, and intense, complex and, for the most
part, successful negotiations on the other hand, with relatively little pub-
licity. It is this subject-official export financing-that I will briefly dis-
cuss today.
Most industrialized countries, and an increasing number of develop-
ing countries, have special agencies of their governments, known as ex-
port credit agencies, devoted to fostering exports through export
financing programs. Examples are the Export-Import Bank of the
United States ("Eximbank") and the Export Development Corporation
of Canada ("EDC"). The world's official export credit agencies typically
offer two basic types of support for their country's exports: credit risk
insurance to protect exporters or their banks when they offer extended
repayment terms to foreign buyers, often in high-risk developing coun-
tries; and medium- to long-term government loans to foreign buyers of
exports, usually at subsidized rates. Thus, official export financing is
used as an important and powerful tool for the development of export
markets and as a means of competing with other countries through the
subsidization of exports.
The history of the development of export credit agencies goes back
to the period following World War I; some governments had become
painfully aware of international political risks, including those associated
with export activities. To deal with this problem, beginning in 1919, Eu-
ropean exporting countries such as England, France and Belgium estab-
lished export credit guarantee departments. The Eximbank was
established in 1934, with the initial purpose of financing trade with the
USSR - how things change!
After World War II, the industrialized countries became increas-
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ingly involved in exporting capital goods to the less developed countries
("LDCs"). These export markets required more credit with longer re-
payment terms. By the early 1960s, official export financing was increas-
ingly being offered at extended terms with below-market fixed interest
rates. The international export credit war had begun. Official export fi-
nancing was becoming a major, costly element of international trade
competition.
At that time no sector was more affected by the emerging credit
warfare than shipbuilding. The combatants, principally Japanese and
European shipbuilding countries, realized that the situation was getting
out of hand. In 1963, a special working group of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") was established to
begin negotiations on regulation of export subsidies in shipbuilding. Af-
ter six long years of negotiations, an agreement was reached in 1969 on
an "Understanding on Export Credits for Ships." This relatively simple
agreement, with minor revisions, is still in effect today and has served as
a precursor for a subsequent broader consensus on official export credits
in general.
In 1972, an export credit group of the OECD worked out an agree-
ment on a consultation and information exchange framework for official
export financing with terms of over five years. At the same time, a sepa-
rate organization, the International Union of Credit and Investment In-
surers (the Berne Union) reached a similar agreement for short-term
export credits. However, these agreements did not deal with the problem
of subsidized interest rates that were playing an ever-increasing role in
international trade competition.
Finally, in 1974, seven principal exporting countries, the United
States, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and the United
Kingdom, reached a simple, limited "gentlemen's agreement" aimed at
limiting the credit race. By 1978, this arrangement had been broadened
into a sixteen page set of Consensus guidelines entitled "Arrangement on
Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits" and was adopted by
twenty-two member countries of the OECD. This Arrangement estab-
lished a matrix of minimum fixed rates for official export credits of
7.25% to 8.00% and maximum repayment terms ranging from 2 to 10
years. Further, the Arrangement established consultation, notification
and matching procedures among the participants.
Although the Arrangement was a major breakthrough in establish-
ing discipline in official export financing, the United States, as well as
Canada, felt that this agreement should be a first step on the road to
reduced subsidization of exports and pressed for increases in minimum
rates and stricter rules for the use of official aid as a vehicle for heavily
subsidizing exports. However, the European Community ("EC") re-
fused to entertain further reductions in subsidies. The 1979 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") prohibited subsidizing most
exports, except to the extent that GATT members are a party to an inter-
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national multilateral undertaking on official export credits. Thus, the EC
saw the Arrangement as the only acceptable means of using export subsi-
dies for export promotion and competitive purposes, a practice the EC
wished to continue.
As market rates soared above the fixed matrix rates specified in the
Arrangement and export subsidy costs became enormous, the United
States and Canada on one side, and the EC on the other, were dead-
locked on this issue. Finally in 1982, after five years of confrontation, the
minimum arrangement rates were increased and a small increase in disci-
pline on the use of aid for trade was realized. From 1982 to 1986, the
confrontation continued as subsidy costs continued to be a major prob-
lem and as the trade and aid-distorting practice of using heavily subsi-
dized aid programs for trade development purposes proliferated.
Finally, in 1986 and 1987, agreements were reached on sweeping
changes in the Arrangement aimed at further reduction or, in some cases,
elimination of export subsidies. Minimum export credit rates are now
automatically adjusted as market rates rise or fall. The cost of the use of
aid for trade purposes was substantially increased, with the objective of
making this practice too costly for widespread use.
As will be discussed by our next speaker, more remains to be accom-
plished in the never-ending battle to eliminate trade subsidies. We can
report, however, that the twenty-two principal industrialized exporting
countries, all with fiercely competing export trade programs, have man-
aged to agree to cooperate to substantially reduce the intensity and cost
of export credit warfare. Although not as dramatic and highly publi-
cized as other international negotiations over the years, this "gentlemen's
agreement," with all of its imperfections, is making a significant contri-
bution to the reduction of subsidy costs, to the elimination of trade fric-
tion and to "leveling the playing field" in international trade.
Turning briefly to the U.S. Government export finance program,
Eximbank is the independent U.S. Government agency that helps finance
and facilitate the export of U.S. goods and services. Eximbank was
founded in 1934 to stimulate foreign trade during the depression. Since
then, Eximbank has contributed export financing support for nearly $200
billion of U.S. exports, including $10 billion in 1987. Eximbank is
chartered by Congress periodically and is mandated to provide export
loan, guarantee and insurance programs that are competitive with those
export financing programs offered by other governments. Further, Ex-
imbank is required to avoid competition with private sector financing
institutions and to seek a reasonable assurance of repayment in all of its
export financing transactions.
Originally, Eximbank was capitalized with $1 billion by Congress.
Since that original capitalization, Eximbank has operated on a self-sus-
taining basis without further appropriations. In fact, the original $1 bil-
lion capitalization has been more than returned to the U.S. Treasury in
the form of dividends. By 1980, the bank had also accumulated capital
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and reserves amounting to approximately $3.2 billion. Since reaching
that level, our total capital and reserves has rapidly dwindled to approxi-
mately $1.3 billion. Nearly the entire $1 billion drop is attributable to
being forced to participate in the export credit subsidy warfare of the past
decade in order to compete with the export subsidy programs of the
other principal exporting countries.
The U.S. Government does not wish to be in the export credit sub-
sidy business and has been a leader in pressing for the reduction and
ultimate elimination of such trade-distorting practices. Today, Ex-
imbank's primary role is to provide credit risk protection to lenders offer-
ing export financing in support of U.S. exports, particularly in those
developing countries where financing is not available without such gov-
emnment guarantees or insurance. As a result of the successful negotia-
tions on export credit subsidies, the need for subsidized loans has
dropped dramatically. However, such subsidies have not been eliminated
in the world marketplace and more work remains ahead of us.
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